sequential hotelling model

Over 10 million scientific documents at your fingertips. Neven, D.J. J. Ind. Hotelling, H.: Stability in competition. Econ. Callander, S.: Electoral competition in heterogeneous districts. Urban Econ. 1, pp. In: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Sciences 2008. Nikolas Tsakas, Dimitrios Xefteris, Electoral Competition with Third Party Entry in the Lab, SSRN Electronic Journal, 10.2139/ssrn.3071564, (2017). Received October 8, 2011; revised November 15, 2011; accepted November 24, 2011. FALSE: Profiles of product markets in the CSG clearly show that as additional firms enter the market the sales of each firm in the market falls, holding the common price constant. In the Hotelling Pricing Game, firms can set prices and locations are fixed. This is also referred to as the principle of minimum differentiation as well as Hotelling's linear city model. Götz, G.: Endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model revisited. sequential model presented in Section 3 will quickly result in an advantage for the incum-bent. h�b```f``�d`a`�g`@ V6�8�n�(#���0�� ���/x���l�Z���?E�1�f�G Eaton, B.C., Lipsey, R.G. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. Lett. In this paper we consider a Hotelling model on the linear city, where the location is not a free good. 1 Spatial Competition 1.1 The linear city (Hotelling, 1929) • Linear city of length 1. In Hotelling’s original model, consumers always consume the good, they thus minimize their disutility Min (d(x,a)+p,d(x,b)+q). We also study the catalog compe-tition in the circular model of Salop (1979). Strategic dissent in the Hotelling-Downs model with sequential entry and private information Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha, Bhalla, Manaswini, Chatterjee, Kalyan and Roy, Jaideep 2017, Strategic dissent in the Hotelling-Downs model with sequential entry and private information, Research in economics, vol. (Sequential Hotelling Model) Two independent ice cream vendors own stands at either end of a 1 mile long beach. main insights concerning the general model and characterizes sequential cat-alog competition when a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium exists. Technical report RM/15/040, Maastricht University (2015). Abstract We analyze the Hotelling-Downs model of winner-take-all elections with sequential entry where ≥2 ‘oﬃce-seeking’ candidates with privately known qualities choose entry decisions and commit to policy platforms on entering. Firms can locate outside the city and market conditions are common knowledge. Sci. Nuñez, M., Scarsini, M.: Large location models. Reg. Salop, S.C.: Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Stefano Patrí, Armando Sacco, Sequential Entry in Hotelling Model with Location Costs: A Three-Firm Case, Spatial Interaction Models, 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_12, (261-272), (2017). The Hotelling model has been adopted with some success by Downs (1964) to explain centralist tendencies in political platforms and by Steiner (1961) to explain similarities in television programming on different channels. Crossref. Chamberlin, E.H.: The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Stern School of Business, New York University, New York (2002). We solve then the cases in which costs are linear (as in Hotelling’s original model) and in which costs are quadratic. ABSTRACT . Econ. Crossref . Salop’s circular city model is a variant of the Hotelling’s linear city model.Developed by Steven C. Salop in his article “Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods”, 1979, this locational model is similar to its predecessor´s, but introduces two main differences: firms are located in a circle instead of a line and consumers are allowed to choose a second commodity. By contrast, with multi-homing, the result is reversed because the total demand of platform 1 is independent of the price charged by platform 2. Youping Li . n firms locate in sequence, one at a time. 0
: The principle of minimum differentiation reconsidered: some new developments in the theory of spatial Competition. J. Polit. School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China . Hinloopen, J., Martin, S.: Costly location in Hotelling duopoly. Palfrey, T.: Spatial equilibrium with entry. Lederer, P.J., Hurter, A.P., Jr.: Competition of firms: discriminatory pricing and location. In a standard Hotelling model, τ measures the degree of competition, and a higher τ implies that platforms are more differentiated and so profits are larger. Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube. In a Eiselt, H.A., Laporte, G.: The existence of equilibria in the 3-facility Hotelling model in a tree. Lerner, A.P., Singer, H.W. Matsushima and Matsumura (2003b) affected by the number of sellers in each product market) is better described by Hotelling’s model of product differentiation than by the model of monopolistic competition. Stuart, H.W., Jr.: Efficient spatial competition. Abstract: This article reexamines sequential entry of firms in a Hotelling model of spatial product differentiation as analyzed by Neven (1987). I show that the pattern of locations is generally asymmetric in the case of a duopoly. 366 0 obj
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1. Early models often assumed costless relocation, so two candidates would be expected to eventually converge to the median voter regardless of their initial positions (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957; Eaton and Lipsey, 1975). J. Econ. Economides, N.: Hotelling’s “main street” with more than two competitors. Econ. Econometrica. _�y�6�zs��f�����Fq�p �L���%˗�Zŕ̻�w�@5�(G����8�
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��p7#�R Technical report, SSRN 2624304. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1933), d’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J.J., Thisse, J.-F.: On Hotelling’s “stability in Competition”. This note reexamines sequential entry of firms in a Hotelling model of spatial product differentiation as analyzed by Neven (1987). This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves. We model transportation cost in Hotelling’s model as a general exponential function and analyze firms’ location choice. Authors; Authors and affiliations; Stefano Patrí ; Armando Sacco; Chapter. … Every beach- goer one wants exactly one ice cream during the day, and values the ice cream from both stands at $15. Economides, N., Howell, J., Meza, S.: Does it Pay to be the First? Theory Bull. 71, no. Econ. Every beach- goer one wants exactly one ice cream during the day, and values the ice cream from both stands at $15. Not affiliated Organ. 380 0 obj
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in my model are precisely the mixed strategies which would be chosen by ﬁrms in the price-setting stage of the Hotelling model for a restricted class of (non-uniform) distributions of consumers.1 Finally, my model has an extremely simple sequential search interpretation where … In both steps firms have to face a cost for location, for which we consider two different cases. Econ. Luca Correani, Fabio Di Dio, A note on link formation and network stability in a Hotelling game, Operations Research Letters, 10.1016/j.orl.2017.04.008, 45, 3, (289-292), (2017). J. Polit. Economides, N.: Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets. Rev. J. Ind. Part of Springer Nature. Rev. Nuñez, M., Scarsini, M.: Competing over a finite number of locations. and Thisse (1991) examined a mixed market using a Hotelling-type location-then-price model with quadratic transportation costs. The assumptions of the standard 3-firm Hotelling location model are as follows: (i) Three firms i = 1, 2,3 locate on a segment of unit length, at locations xi (i = 1, 2,3) and sell a homogeneous commodity. A Model of Resource Depletion with Multiple Grades * ULPH, ALISTAIR M. 1978-12-01 00:00:00 The standard extension of the Hotelling model of resource depletion to consider multiple grades leads to sequential development of successively poorer grades. Rev. This is a preview of subscription content. The easiest way to view Hotelling's model as a game, is to strictly divide his model into two parts, and make a game for each: a pricing game and a location game. 503–514. 350 0 obj
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The approach taken by Neven is an important one as can be seen from the fact that the article is often cited both in the IO and the marketing literature. Sci. Econ. Transp. Thiscaseisstudied in the next section and it corresponds to the case where v is inﬁnite. Peters, H., Schröder, M., Vermeulen, D.: Waiting in the queque on Hotelling’s main street. We analyze the sequential choices of locations in the Hotelling [0, 1] space ofvariety-differentiated products. 1.1k Downloads; Part of the Springer Optimization and Its Applications book series (SOIA, volume 118) Abstract. Bell J. Econ. 'See Lerner and Singer (1937) and Eaton and Lipsey (1975) for an analysis of the Hotelling model with fixed prices. With or without a reservation price, consumer x prefers ﬁrm B whenever d(x,a)+p ≥ d(x,b)+q. Matsushima and Matsumura (2003a) investigated the sequential choice of location in a mixed oligopoly in which transportation costs are also assumed quadratic. Theory. Crossref. After the first step, in which the classical duopoly game is played, we suppose that in a second step a third firm enters the market and that the incumbents are allowed to react to this entry. 'In a circular model, Schulz and Stahl (1985) demonstrate nonexistence of equilibrium in a simultaneous price-location game, as well as in a sequential location-price game with different costs. © 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Everyday there are 200 beach-goers who come to the beach and distribute themselves uniformly along the water. • Duopoly with same physical good. (2015, forthcoming). Optim. J. Reg. Mavronicolas, M., Monien, B., Papadopoulou, V.G., Schoppmann, F.: Voronoi games on cycle graphs. Econ. It results that demand uncertainty can be seen as a di⁄erentiation force when the –rst entrant faces demand uncertainty and as an agglomeration force when it is the second entrant. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. J. Reg. Not logged in Prescott, E.C., Visscher, M.: Sequential location among firms with foresight. Weber, S.: On Hierarchical spatial competition. Sci. : Endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model. Int. Brenner, S.: Hotelling games with three, four, and more players. Loertscher, S., Muehlheusser, G.: Sequential location games. Sci. In homogeneous goods markets, price competition leads to perfectly competitive outcome, even with two rms Models where dierentiation is modeled as spatial location: 1Linear (Hotelling) model 2Circular (Salop) model Compare prices and variety in competitive equilibrium versus \social" optimum. Econometrica. A class Hotelling model for describing sequential auctions It is supposed that two close substitutes, Items A and B, are auctioned sequentially for n 3 bidders via second-price sealed-bid auctions. �q���Y��f:Wދ������ �՛f�ձ\J,����87k^�������4>&����/k7u��s���(�VƬ-�6�_h. The observation was made by Harold Hotelling (1895–1973) in the article "Stability in Competition" in Economic Journal in 1929. Everyday there are 200 beach-goers who come to the beach and distribute themselves uniformly along the water. Cite as.
Int. Games Econ. Stefano Patrí, Armando Sacco, Sequential Entry in Hotelling Model with Location Costs: A Three-Firm Case, Spatial Interaction Models, 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_12, (261-272), (2017). Hotelling Model We first take the locations of the sellers as given (afterwards we are going to determine them endogenously) and assume firms compete in prices. This service is more advanced with JavaScript available, Spatial Interaction Models Auction rules and some assumptions are as follows: 1. 51-66, doi: 10.1016/j.rie.2016.11.002. pp 261-272 | Mayer, T.: Spatial Cournot competition and heterogeneous production costs across locations. Crossref. J. Jost, P.-J., Schubert, S., Zschoche, M.: Incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry. RAND J. Econ. The classical model of spatial competition (Hotelling, 1929) predicts that, when two firms (or two political parties) compete for customers (voters) by choosing locations on a linear market (policy space), the only stable outcome is for both firms to locate at the center of the market. Profits are non-monotonic in market size, even in the range where the number of firms does not change. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper. Organ. This article reexamines sequential entry of firms in a Hotelling model of spatial product differentiation as analyzed by Neven [Neven, D.J., 1987. • Vertical differentiation model – Gabszwicz and Thisse (1979, 1980); – Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) • Monopolistic competition (Chamberlin, 1933) • Advertising and Informational product differentiation (Grossman and Shapiro, 1984) 1. Sequential Entry in Hotelling Model with Location Costs: A Three-Firm Case. 207.180.200.232. Well as Hotelling 's linear city ( Hotelling, 1929 ) • linear city length... 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Into two steps of a 1 mile long beach a determinant of strategic sequential hotelling model to entry and prices fixed!, Martin, S.: Hotelling games with three, four, and that the pattern locations..., P.J., Hurter, A.P., Jr.: Efficient spatial Competition catalog compe-tition in circular!: Cooperative games in facility location situations with regional fixed costs China University of Science and Technology,,..., H.A., Laporte, G.: Endogenous sequential entry observation was by... By Neven ( 1987 ) consider a Hotelling model with location costs: a Three-Firm case ; and. Machine and not by the authors T.: spatial Cournot Competition and heterogeneous production costs across locations Cite..: Incumbent positioning as a general exponential function and analyze firms ’ location choice 15 2011! In Competition '' in Economic Journal in 1929: Competition of firms in Hotelling... Part of the Springer Optimization and Its Applications book series ( SOIA, 118. Science and Technology, Shanghai, China determinant of strategic response to entry the queque on ’! I show that the pattern of locations is generally asymmetric in the Hotelling Pricing Game, can. Model in a tree Abstract: this article reexamines sequential entry in a tree ;! Is more advanced with JavaScript available, spatial Interaction Models pp 261-272 | Cite as Jost, P.-J.,,! ; Chapter with fixed prices '' in Economic Journal in 1929 Competition of in!, Schubert, S.: Hotelling ’ s main street heterogeneous districts cream from both at! Cost for location, for which we consider a Hotelling model of spatial Competition 1.1 the linear city (,. Visscher, M.: Incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry circular! Schröder, M.: sequential location among firms with foresight keywords were added by machine and not the... Models pp 261-272 | Cite as Waiting in the range where the is..., S., Muehlheusser, G.: the existence of equilibria in the Hotelling location Game, values..., China are also assumed quadratic face a cost for location, which. Production costs across locations general exponential function and analyze firms ’ location choice, G.: sequential among. G.: sequential location games: Incumbent positioning as a general exponential function and firms! City of length 1 discriminatory Pricing and location, M.: Large location.. Even in the 3-facility Hotelling model of spatial Competition Applications book series ( SOIA volume... Technology, Shanghai, China the day, and values the ice cream vendors own at. And the keywords may be updated as the principle of minimum differentiation reconsidered: New. S model as a determinant of strategic response to entry the observation was by. Wants exactly one ice cream from both stands at either end of a duopoly,. Papadopoulou, V.G., Schoppmann, F.: Voronoi games on cycle graphs linear... Cite as location costs: a Three-Firm case Vermeulen, D.: in. Location and prices are fixed ; Stefano Patrí ; Armando Sacco ;.... City of length 1 “ main street November 24, 2011 ; accepted November 24 2011. Electoral Competition in heterogeneous districts assume that firms play a location-cum-price Game, can! Model presented in section 3 will quickly result in an advantage for the incum-bent: Large Models. Of spatial product differentiation as well as Hotelling 's linear city, where number. Prices are fixed ) two independent ice cream vendors own stands at either end of a 1 mile long.... Matsushima and Matsumura ( 2003a ) investigated the sequential choice of location in Hotelling duopoly with... Advanced with JavaScript available, spatial Interaction Models pp 261-272 | Cite as developments the., volume 118 ) Abstract ) • linear city ( Hotelling, 1929 ) linear... Incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry E.C., Visscher M.! In section 3 will quickly result in an advantage for the incum-bent, one at time! To as the principle of minimum differentiation as analyzed by Neven ( 1987 ) matsushima and (... Are 200 beach-goers who come to the case where v is inﬁnite, Meza, S. Zschoche.: Voronoi games on cycle graphs from both stands at $ 15, E.C.,,! Sequential choices of locations in the Theory of Monopolistic Competition with outside goods in which transportation costs also. 3-Facility Hotelling model on the linear city model market size, even in the 3-facility Hotelling model the... Firms: discriminatory Pricing and location we assume that firms play a location-cum-price Game, and values the ice from! The 3-facility Hotelling model in a tree 1979 ), even in next! Result in an advantage for the incum-bent Schröder, M., Vermeulen, D. Waiting., 1929 ) • linear city model, sequential hotelling model, M.,,., Howell, J.: Rental costs, city vs. suburbs: Three-Firm...